Summary
The first discussion of the Tusculan Disputations is on the nature of death; whether it should be despised, and whether it is wretched. So, the discourse is sprung from the first proposition: Death is an evil. Now, in order for death to be an evil, it is a agreed that it must be wretched, but in the event of death one ceases to exist, and that which does not exist cannot be qualified as anything such as “wretched.” If this is so, then death cannot be an evil. The only thing which can make it so is if there is a wretched afterlife, but Cicero claims that the thought of a depraved and wretched underworld is mere fiction. Also, if death were wretched, all of mortal man would be wretched. If anything, death is a good rather than an evil, since it frees the soul from the evil and suffering of the world. That being said, few questions can be answered unless the nature of the soul is discussed; its mortality, or immortality. The arguments for either alternative are discussed; the soul is immortal because it is self moving and is of a divine cause, but other philosophies suggest otherwise. Even in the uncertainty of the soul’s mortality, it still follows the same conclusion: death is not an evil. Because if the soul is immortal, then it is freed from the evils of the body, and if it is mortal, it ceases to exist thus having no nature except that of nothingness, which is neither wretched nor good. Therefore, death is not to be feared, and the wise man welcomes death unfazed.
Now, in the previous topic, it was said that death, if anything, is a good, for it frees the soul from the evil of the body: pain. So here is the proposition: “Pain is an evil.” The Epicureans would agree that it is the greatest evil, therefore it is to be avoided. The Stoics would argue that rather than being avoided or relieved, it must be endured, and virtue makes pain endurable. Pain must be despised and looked on as an evil, just so that it can be overcome. By the faculties of Reason and virtue, man can endure pain and be beyond it. This requires great mastery and control of oneself, a chief virtue of the Stoics. It is honorable and noble to endure hardship calmly. In conclusion, pain is a slight evil, if an evil at all, but it is not much of one, since it can be overcome.
So, if pain and distress can be overcome by reason, virtue, and fortitude, is the wise man free from distress? Distress is defined as disorder of the soul, and consequently unsoundness of the mind. Distress is a weakness in man’s nature, and it is healed by philosophy. The philosopher, or the wise man, should be free from distress, since virtue or fortitude and distress are mutually exclusive. He is free from pity, envy, anger, which are all forms of distress, for he has full mastery of his mind. This is the Stoic argument. Now, disorder divided becomes distress, delight, desire, and fear. The first, distress, is caused not by external causes, but rather judgements and notions within the mind. Men think that they should distress at one’s death, when it is really useless, and merely hinders the mind. Also, it is not events which cause distress but rather how one perceives those events. One makes a judgement of whether a given situation is worthy of distress. Therefore, distress is not natural but rather the consequence of wrong opinions.
Now, if the wise man is free from distress, is he susceptible to the other disorders of the soul? Now, as mentioned earlier, the disorders are a consequence of judgements which contradict right nature and Reason. Disorders are also divided as being of longing and aversion; delight and lust (longing), and distress and fear (aversion). The disorder of the soul can be compared to disorder of the body. It is a rejection of right nature, only when it is in the mind, it is voluntary. When one is ill in the body, he does not reject the doctor, but oddly enough those who have disorders of the mind reject the doctor that is Reason. That is the disorder itself. But what makes the wise man wise is his own enslavement to Reason, thus being free of these disorders. The wise man then, is not susceptible to any disorder, and like distress, all of the disorders are a consequence of judgement which strays from reason and right nature.
The final discussion springs from this question: “Is virtue sufficient for leading a happy life?” The answer is yes; Nature makes all things right and perfect, disorders distract from this right order. When the order is disturbed, vice becomes, causing misery. Virtue is the only thing which can overcome disorder. So, to be free from misery, virtue is necessary, and to be free from misery means to be happy, therefore, virtue is necessary for the happy life. Over all in all of the disputations, Cicero has taken favor to the Stoic paradigm; where virtue is simply fortitude.
Analysis
What is virtue? Philosophers have been in contemplation of this term since the beginning of the Great Conversation. The conclusion of the Tusculan Disputations seems to be that virtue is synonymous with fortitude. The four cardinal virtues are: Justice, prudence, courage, and temperance; fortitude in your biases, in your impulses, in pain, and over the passions. It is self-mastery, self-control, and self-contentment. This, the Stoics and Cicero believe to be all that is necessary for happiness; and it does logically follow. He who is master of himself, contented, and controlled, is imperturbable, for his soul is ordered, and there is nothing which disorders it, causing pain or distress. Where there is no sorrow or distress, there is happiness, happiness meaning fulfillment; he who is contented is fulfilled. Now, this belief suggests that in order to be virtuous, thus happy, one must rid himself of all fear and desire. He must overpower with Reason the impulses of hope and compassion, and call them disorders.
When one possesses neither fear nor desire, one is in a state of complete indifference. Fulfilled, but not overflowing, satisfied, but not stuffed, content and happy, but not overjoyed (joy is also considered a disorder). For if one has no desire, one can never experience gratification, and if one has no fear, then one has no sorrow. The question becomes; is this truly best way for man to live? As good Lutherans, we know that in order to be free from the earthly things which enslave us, we must conversely be enslaved to God. In the same way, it seems that in order to be indifferent to the life of the world, we must desire God. Man has already shown that he longs for God, for even if he doesn’t long for the God of the Holy Trinity, he finds other gods to fulfill his longing, be it false deities, money, or himself. What is supposed to be exhibited by this is that not all desire is a necessary disorder of the soul. It does not go against Reason to desire God; for it is Him who Reason guides us in our ascent towards. God is goodness, truth, and beauty itself; the object of the “chariot,” and the chariot needs horses. Therefore, God is to be desired by the soul of every man, and because of this, Christ, His Son, is the one who brings fulfillment, with great joy and gratification. I then conclude that the Stoic standpoint only gives a part of the picture, but it most certainly is relevant.
THE EDUCATION OF A MILLENNIAL 